On Modelling Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty In The Likelihood Ratio Approach To Evidential Reasoning by Keppens, Jeroen
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1007/s10506-014-9157-3
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Keppens, J. (2014). On Modelling Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty In The Likelihood Ratio Approach To Evidential
Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 22(3), 239-290. 10.1007/s10506-014-9157-3
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Self-archived copy of a paper published in Artificial Intelligence and Law (2014) 22: 239–290.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10506-014-9157-3
On Modelling Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty In The
Likelihood Ratio Approach To Evidential Reasoning
Jeroen Keppens
Abstract When the likelihood ratio approach is employed for evidential reasoning
in law, it is often necessary to employ subjective probabilities, which are probabil-
ities derived from the opinions and judgement of a human (expert). At least three
concerns arise from the use of subjective probabilities in legal applications. Firstly,
human beliefs concerning probabilities can be vague, ambiguous and inaccurate. Sec-
ondly, the impact of this vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy on the outcome of a
probabilistic analysis is not necessarily fully understood. Thirdly, the provenance of
subjective probabilities and the associated potential sources of vagueness, ambiguity
and inaccuracy tend to be poorly understood, making it difficult for the outcome of
probabilistic reasoning to be explained and validated, which is crucial in legal appli-
cations. The former two concerns have been addressed by a wide body of research
in AI. The latter, however, has received little attention. This paper presents a novel
approach to employ argumentation to reason about probability distributions in prob-
abilistic models. It introduces a range of argumentation schemes and corresponding
sets of critical questions for the construction and validation of argument models that
define sets of probability distributions. By means of an extended example, the paper
demonstrates how the approach, argumentation schemes and critical questions can be
employed for the development of models and their validation in legal applications of
the likelihood ratio approach to evidential reasoning.
Keywords Evidential Reasoning, Bayesian Reasoning, Argumentation
1 Introduction
In AI and Law, approaches to evidential reasoning can be classified according to three
categories denoting the type of methodology employed: argumentative, narrative and
probabilistic. Argumentative evidential reasoning is concerned with decomposing the
reasons to agree or disagree with information inferred from the available evidence
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into distinct arguments and to analyse their interrelationships [45]. Narrative eviden-
tial reasoning aims to produce a coherent story to explain the available evidence [7].
Probabilistic evidential reasoning seeks to assess the value of individual pieces of
evidence in deciding which of a number of conflicting hypotheses to accept [11,36].
Increasingly, different evidential reasoning approaches are combined with a view to
tackle more complex questions or to address particular weaknesses of individual ap-
proaches.
This article is concerned with the development of probabilistic models for evi-
dential reasoning that aim to assess the value of evidence. This is challenging for a
number of reasons. Firstly, the meaning of assessments of the value of evidence de-
rived from a probabilistic model and the context within which it must be considered
is often misunderstood [18]. Secondly, as models of complex problems, probabilistic
models are abstractions of real-world scenarios. It can be difficult to ensure that all
the qualitatively significant variables and relationships between these variables have
been included.
Thirdly, probabilistic models compute joint probability distributions that assume
that the probability distributions of certain variables are independent from one an-
other under certain conditions [44]. It can be difficult to ensure that appropriate in-
dependence assumptions are made. Various authors have sought to tackle these con-
cerns. For example, Fenton et. al. [25], Hepler et. al. [32] and Vlek et. al. [57] have
identified and formalised key idioms employed in Bayesian models of evidential rea-
soning and developed methods to compose these into Bayesian models. Fenton et. al.
and Hepler et. al. formalise these by means of composable fragments of Bayesian net-
works whereas Vlek et. al. employ narratives that are then converted into Bayesian
networks. Keppens has presented an algorithm designed to extract arguments from
probabilistic (Bayesian) models as a means to aid the validation of the structure of
such models [35].
Fourthly, probabilistic models require probability distributions as input and some
of these probability distributions are based on subjective human judgement, which
may be flawed. Forensic statisticians employ sensitivity analysis to assess the effect
of perturbations in such probabilities on the outcome of an analysis [2]. But while
Bayesian inference mechanisms have been analysed and validated extensively [24],
it is not unreasonable to question subjective probability values, the reasons for vari-
ability in such values and its magnitude. To facilitate such questioning by legal pro-
fessionals, it is helpful to reduce subjective probability values and their variability to
understandable propositions that can be attacked. This paper aims to accomplish this
by incorporating argumentation as a means to reason about and validate subjective
probability in a symbolic manner.
The approach introduced in this paper is based on a proposal by Druzdzel and van
der Gaag to represent knowledge with regard to probability distributions by means of
constraints [20]. Druzdzel and van der Gaag’s motivation for such an approach is that
it enables qualitative and quantitative information about probability distributions to
be combined. In other words, these constraint based models can express probabilistic
knowledge with varying degrees of precision. As such, this approach provides the
same form of validation as a sensitivity analysis aiming to determine how the outcome
of an analysis changes as probability values in the model vary [27], except that that
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variations in probability values are entered at the start and are assumed to stem from
an expert’s inherent uncertainty in providing those values. Neither Druzdzel and van
der Gaag’s constraint based approach nor sensitivity analysis provide a means to
scrutinise the underlying reasons for choosing certain constraints or probability value
ranges, however. As such, these approaches can compute the potential implications
in correct probability estimations, but they cannot identify reasons why probability
distribution estimates might be incorrect.
Models of argumentation have been used effectively as a means of scrutinising
human reasoning. In particular, argumentation schemes (generic models of justifi-
cations for deriving certain conclusions based on a set of circumstances, observa-
tions and first principles) with corresponding sets of critical questions (schemes of
attacks on the aforementioned justifications) have been shown to be particularly ef-
fective in the validation of evidential reasoning [8,52]. This paper shows how argu-
ments supporting constraints over probability distributions can be defined and used
to scrutinise probabilistic models of evidential reasoning. It introduces a set of argu-
mentation schemes for defining such arguments and sets of associated critical ques-
tions to support their validation. The suitability of the set of defined argumentation
schemes is demonstrated by means of a case study in which the probability distribu-
tions in a complex evidential reasoning model from the forensic statistics literature
are redefined by means of argumentation models instantiated from the argumentation
schemes.
2 Background
2.1 The Likelihood Ratio Approach to Compute the Value of Evidence
A likelihood ratio expresses how strongly evidence supports one hypaothesis over
another, in a manner that is independent of prior beliefs in the hypotheses. Let h1 and
h2 be two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, both put forward as alterna-
tive explanations of a piece of observed evidence e. The likelihood of a hypothesis hi
is an assessment of that hypothesis’s capacity to produce observation e [40]. In other
words, the likelihood of hi expresses how plausible it would be to encounter evidence
e in a possible world where hi holds true, irrespective of the plausibility or ones belief
in hi. The likelihood ratio LR(e|h1,h2) is an assessment of the relative ability of the
alternative hypotheses h1 and h2 to explain evidence e. In other words, LR(e|h1,h2)
determines how much better/weaker an explanation h1 is for e compared to h2.
The likelihood ratio is important to evidential reasoning in law because it rep-
resents an assessment of the value of evidence, from the perspective of a neutral
observer who ought not to be affected by prior beliefs in h1 or h2. In other words,
taken by itself, a likelihood ratio says nothing about the odds of hypotheses. Instead,
the likelihood ratio describes how the odds of hypotheses change in response to the
evidence. For this reason, this approach is favoured by many forensic scientists as the
basis for presenting evidence in court [12].
It is common to express the likelihood of hi as the probability of e given that hi
is presumed true: P(e|hi). Such a probability satisfies the aforementioned definition
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as (i) P(e|hi) measures the plausibility of e given hi and (ii) P(e|hi) is independent
of the prior probability P(hi) because hi is set to true in order to compute P(e|hi). It
follows that the likelihood ratio is [2]:
LR(e|h1,h2) = P(e|h1)P(e|h2) (1)
With this definition, the likelihood ratio expresses how the posterior odds of the hy-
potheses (in light of the evidence) are related to the prior odds of the hypotheses
(before evidence was available). This follows from a simply rewriting of Bayes’s
theorem:
P(h1|e)
P(h2|e) =
P(e|h1)
P(e|h2) ×
P(h1)
P(h2)
or:
Posterior Odds of Hypotheses = LR×Prior Odds of Hypotheses (2)
Equation (2) shows how the likelihood ratio affects the odds of hypotheses.
In many evidential reasoning problems, probabilistic models to compute the nu-
merator and denominator of (1) that are both precise and accurate, are not available.
However, the likelihood ratio approach to compute the value of evidence need not
be restricted to evidential reasoning problems where precise and accurate models are
available [40]. Probabilistic models that account for the vagueness of the knowledge
they are based on, allow for the likelihood ratio and the corresponding assessment of
the value of evidence to be computed accurately, albeit less precisely [34]. But, prob-
lems may arise when this vagueness is not accounted for adequately and the model
suggests a greater precision of analysis than the available model allows.
2.2 R v T & Argumentation Based Bayesian Evidential Reasoning
There have been a number of high profile appeal court cases where invalid appli-
cations of probabilistic evaluations of evidence in general and the likelihood ratio
approach in particular have been the cause of miscarriages of justice. One recent and
representative example is the judgement in R v T, a case heard in the High Court
of Justice, Court of Appeal [4]. This case has gained notoriety in the evidential rea-
soning and forensic science communities because it imposes severe restrictions on
the use of the likelihood ratio approach. A range of eminent researchers in this field
have reported and discussed various flaws in the reasoning that lead to this conclu-
sion [6,23,40,47,50,54]. However, for the purposes of this paper, I am interested in
the specific appeal considered in the judgement in R v T, and the Court’s reasons for
quashing the original conviction.
At the original trial, T had been identified as the murderer of a victim on the basis
of footwear marks (e) left at the scene of the crime. A forensic expert in evaluating
footwear mark evidence had compared the footwear marks with footwear belong-
ing to T. Following the likelihood ratio approach to evaluation of footwear mark
evidence [12,22], the expert compared the likelihood that T’s footwear made the
footwear mark (P(e|h1)) to the likelihood that some other shoe made the footwear
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mark (P(e|h2)). In accordance with best practice among footwear experts in England
and Wales, four factors were considered to compute these probabilities: sole pattern,
shoe size, amount of wear and unique features, such as scratches and cuts caused by
damage. The expert estimated that about 1 in 5 shoes would have a sole pattern con-
sistent with the footwear mark recovered from the crime scene, about 1 in 10 shoes
would leave the size 11 footwear mark recovered from the crime scene, about 1 in 2
shoes would exhibit wear consistent with that observed in the footwear mark and no
shoes could be excluded on the basis of individual characteristics. On that basis, the
likelihood ratio in this case was calculated to be:
LR =
P(e|h1)
P(e|h2) =
1
1
5 × 110 × 12 ×1
= 100 (3)
On the basis of this analysis, and the reporting standard presented in [12], the expert
reported:
”[...] there is at this stage a moderate degree of scientific evidence to support
the view that the [footwear belonging to T] had made the footwear marks [...]”
[4]
There are a number of concerns about this conclusion and the reasoning that led up
to it, which are presented in the judgement. The first concern is that the conclusion
of the expert can be interpreted as a statement about the probability that the footwear
belonging to T had made the footwear marks or the probability that T had committed
the crime. But, this is not the type of conclusion that can be derived from a likelihood
ratio. Another way of verbalising the notion LR = 100 might be:
”The footwear mark evidence, taken by itself, provides a moderate degree
of support for the view that the footwear mark belonging to T made the
footwear marks at the crime scene, as opposed to the view that a random
item of footwear made those marks.”
There are two important features of a likelihood ratio that need to be conveyed. On
the one hand, the likelihood ratio compares two competing propositions or hypothe-
ses. The nature of these propositions is important. In this case, the likelihood ratio
compares one feature of the prosecution hypothesis, i.e. that a specific shoe made a
mark, with a competing feature of the defence hypothesis, i.e. that the footwear mark
was made by another shoe. On the other hand, as shown in (2), the likelihood ratio
relates posterior odds to prior odds. It does not state whether a jury ought to believe
one hypothesis over another. Instead, it states how such beliefs ought to be affected
by the evidence as this is what an expert in evidence is expected to comment on. In
this instance, without any further identifying information, it would be reasonable to
believe that the prior odds of the prosecution hypothesis are very small relative to
the defence hypothesis because the prosecution hypothesis argues that one individual
pair of footwear made the marks whereas the defence hypothesis allows for a very
large collection of shoes that could have made the marks. The likelihood ratio of (3)
alters those odds by a factor 100 but this would not be enough to alter the favoured
hypothesis in this scenario. The quote from the original trial, as reported in R v T
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does not appear to convey this clearly. Various other papers discuss ways in which a
likelihood ratio analysis of forensic evidence could be reported better [26,40].
The second concern is that the likelihood ratio and the probabilities underpinning
it might convey an inaccurate amount of precision. Various arguments are raised in
R v T that variations in the proportion of patterns, sizes and wear encountered in
different data sets might lead a forensic examiner to formulate different conclusions
about the value of the evidence:
”The jury were given two important statistics based on the population as a
whole:
a) for pattern type of 0.25% or 1 in 400; this was given by the judge, [...]
b) for size of 1 in 33; this was elicited in cross examination [...]’
[...]
If the figures used in the evidence for pattern type (1 in 400) and for size (1
in 33) are multiplied together [...], the result would be a likelihood ratio of 1
in 13,200 as opposed to the likelihood ratio of 1 in 50 used by [the forensic
examiner], based on his more conservative approach. If the figure for wear
[of 1 in 2] used by [the forensic examiner] was then applied [...], then the
likelihood ratio would be 26,400 – in the verbal scale ”very strong support.”
” [4]
In other words, one unmoderated data set could be employed to conclude ”very strong
support” for the hypothesis that footwear belonging to T made the footwear marks at
the crime scene, as opposed to the hypothesis that a random item of footwear made
those marks. At this stage, it is important to point out that, as stated in the above
quote, the jury were given these low probabilities of 1400 and
1
33 in support of the
conclusion of ”moderate degree of scientific evidence to support the view that the
[footwear belonging to T] had made the footwear marks”. However, this conclusion
was supported by more conservative estimates and not by those low, precise point-
probabilities. This is one of the reasons the Appeal Court concluded that ”The process
by which evidence was adduced lacked transparency” [4]. Clearly, a jury cannot be
relied on to interpret an evaluation based on a model where they are given inputs and
outputs that are unrelated. This is one of the key reasons to quash the conviction.
The judgement goes on to claim: ”[...] it would be difficult to see how an opinion
of footwear marks arrived at through the application of a formula could be described
as ’logical’, or ’balanced’ or ’robust’, when the data are as uncertain as we have set
out and could produce such different results” [4]. Thus, it is the judgement’s con-
tention that, if there is a range of possible values for parts or all of the probabilities in
a Bayesian model, then no reliable outcome can be produced with such a model. This
argument is supported by various examples that show how different inputs based on
different sources lead to very different outcomes. The assumption appears to be that a
Bayesian model can only be relied on if there is one set of accurate and precise point
probabilities. This is not correct. There is a rich body of literature on qualitative and
semi-quantitative probabilistic reasoning that demonstrates that accurate probabilis-
tic reasoning is possible with imprecise probabilities, provided that the vagueness of
the knowledge on the basis of which imprecise probabilities are formulated is mod-
elled accurately itself [13,21,42]. In testimony, the footwear expert revealed that the
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probabilities employed to determine that LR = 100 are conservative estimates. In
other words, they are upper bounds. As such, a more accurate way of representing
the probabilities for pattern type, size and wear would be by means of the intervals
[0, 15 ], [0,
1
10 ] and [0,
1
2 ]. This would support a range of likelihood ratios LR ≥ 100,
where the vagueness is due to lack of data. Such intervals reflect the very substantial
amount of uncertainty and vagueness in this domain.
The third concern pertains to the use of ancillary evidence to determine the prob-
abilities in the model. Direct evidence is evidence that informs assessments about
the likelihood of hypotheses [52]. In the case under discussion, the footwear mark is
direct evidence. Ancillary evidence is evidence that affects the ability of direct evi-
dence to inform its assessment of likelihood [52]. In the case under discussion, the
evidence used to estimate the probabilities for pattern type, size and wear is ancillary.
Probabilistic models do not make a distinction between direct and ancillary evidence
[45]. In fact, they tend to incorporate a significant amount of information derived
from the ancillary evidence in the probabilities without referring to it any further.
This can lead to a lack of transparency as has occurred in R v T, which is criticised in
the judgement.
Specifically, the appeal court judgement reports a number of arguments against
the feasibility of computing upper bounds on the probability that certain features are
encountered in randomly selected items of footwear. For example, with regard to
the likelihood of the footwear pattern encountered at the crime scene, the judgement
notes that:
i) The brand of footwear of the suspect is counterfeit frequently and little data is
available on the types and distribution of counterfeit footwear. It is argued that
that makes it impossible to compute the probability of encountering shoes that
possess similar features to those of T.
ii) The footwear pattern found at the crime scene is not only used by the major
footwear manufacturer who produced T’s footwear, but also by smaller footwear
manufacturers. No data is available on the smaller footwear manufacturers. It is
argued that that makes it impossible to compute the probability of encountering
the sole pattern found at the crime scene.
iii) There are substantial local differences in the distribution of shoes. Local distri-
butions of footwear depend substantially on the types of footwear sold by local
shoe stores. It is argued that this makes it impossible to compute the probability
of encountering footwear with a particular sole pattern in a given location, using
only data on the national distribution of footwear.
The extent to which these concerns have been considered in reaching the eventual
conclusion, as it is expressed above, or how the acceptance of any of these counter-
arguments would affect that conclusion remains unclear. Whereas a Bayesian model
of evidential reasoning is able to address the previous two concerns, it provides no
means of incorporating the reasons for accepting or rejecting significant features of
conditional probability distributions, other than to implement their presumed impli-
cations numerically by adjusting the probability distributions. This is not satisfactory
because, as the judgement argues, ”the process by which the evidence was adduced
lacked transparency” [4].
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This paper aims to address the latter concern by incorporating elements of argu-
mentation into probabilistic models. As explained above, the transparency concern
stems from a failure to validate the ancillary evidence that affects the probability val-
ues employed in a probabilistic model. The judgement in R v T does not show, in
my opinion, that this failure is intrinsic to probabilistic models. Instead, it shows the
difficulties of validating probabilistic models without adequately capturing ancillary
evidence and reasoning based on ancillary evidence. Therefore, this paper seeks to
address these difficulties by developing a means to incorporate and validate ancillary
evidence and the way it affects probabilities into a probabilistic model.
3 Approach
3.1 Probabilistic Models
A variety of probabilistic modelling methods can be used to compute the likelihood
ratio in the likelihood ratio approach to evidential reasoning. The work presented
herein does not constrain which of these methods is employed. Throughout this pa-
per the work will be illustrated by means of a Bayesian network (BN) designed to
compute the likelihoods of prosecution and defence hypotheses. In complex eviden-
tial reasoning scenarios, BNs are the most widely used representation formalism to
develop probabilistic models [29] because they allow joint probability distributions
over a large number of variables to be specified and validated with relative easy. BNs
are also of particular interest to the work presented herein, which combines argumen-
tation with probabilistic modelling, because it has been shown that BNs can be used
to model and reason with typical concerns that argumentation models of evidential
reasoning deal with [25,32].
3.1.1 Computing Likelihoods with Bayesian Networks
A BN provides a means to compute the likelihood of a hypothesis h with respect of
a piece of evidence e as specified by the probability P(e|h). It consists of a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) and a set of probability distributions. Each node of the DAG cor-
responds to a variable that affects the value of P(e|h). This variable may be discrete
or continuous. The edges of the DAG specify relationships of probabilistic indepen-
dence that limit the variable-value assignments that the probability distribution of
each variable needs to be conditioned on. Specifically, to compute any conditional or
joint probability distribution over variables of a BN, the probability distribution of
each variable in the BN only needs to be conditioned on the possible combinations of
value assignments of its immediate parent variables in the DAG.
The model of probabilistic independence specified by the DAG of a BN comes
with a relatively straightforward intuitive meaning. This is perhaps most easily under-
stood in the context of the most basic ways in which three variables X , S and Y can be
related by a DAG: a serial connection of the form X→ S→Y , a diverging connection
of the form X ← S→ Y and a converging connection of the form X → S← Y , such
that there is no edge between X and Y in any of these three substructures.
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In a serial connection X→ S→Y , X and Y are probabilistically independent from
one another provided the value of S is known. In a diverging connection X ← S→Y ,
X and Y are also probabilistically independent from one another provided the value
of S is known. In a converging connection X → S← Y , X and Y are probabilistically
independent from one another if the values of S and all of its descendants are not
known. In other words, X and Y are probabilistically dependent from one another,
provided the value of S or one of its descendants is known. Each of these dependence
or independence relationships is relatively easy to check and understand, making
them easy to validate.
The advantage of using a BN to specify a probabilistic model of an evidential
reasoning problem is that it facilitates the development of complex models. This is
perhaps best illustrated by means of a practical example.
3.1.2 A Practical Application: Cross Transfer of Trace Evidence
This section presents a practical application of a BN to produce a model to compute
the likelihood of a hypothesis. The model will be used throughout the remainder of
this paper to illustrate the approach presented herein. It is a minor variation on the
cross transfer of trace evidence model by Aitken, Taroni and Garbolino [3].
The model concerns a scenario involving a violent crime, where there is a vic-
tim, a suspect, a prosecution hypothesis that the suspect committed the crime and
a defence hypothesis that the suspect did not commit the crime. If, in such a sce-
nario, investigators find biological trace material (e.g. blood) on the victim’s body
that matches (e.g. the DNA profile of) the suspect, that finding constitutes evidence
that supports the prosecution hypothesis more strongly than it does the defence hy-
pothesis. If the investigators also find biological trace material on the suspect’s body
that matches the victim’s, that finding constitutes another piece of evidence that sup-
ports the prosecution hypothesis more strongly than it does the defence hypothesis.
However, the second piece of evidence is not independent to the first. A purely sym-
bolic argumentation approach would struggle to specify how much more support the
second piece of evidence adds to the first. But, a probabilistic approach, such as the
one taken by Aitken et. al. can.
The DAG of the cross-transfer model is depicted in Figure 1. The root nodes G,
Bv and Bs of the DAG are employed to specify hypotheses and facts. For example,
hd = g (the suspect is not guilty) is an example of a defence hypothesis with respect
to the trace evidence in question and hp = g (the suspect is guilty) is an example of a
prosecution hypothesis. If the victim’s background (e.g. profession) puts him/her into
contact with the type of trace material under analysis and the suspect’s background
does not, then bv and bs can be treated as undisputed observations. The leaf nodes of
the DAG correspond to the available evidence. For example, retrieval of trace material
from the victim matching the suspect and the failure to match trace material retrieved
from the suspect with the victim could be represented as rmv and rms. In the evidential
reasoning scenario considered herein, the value of the two pieces of evidence would
be computed by the following two likelihood ratios:
LR(rmv|hp,hd) = P(rmv|g,bv,bs)
P(rmv|g,bv,bs)
and LR(rms|hp,hd) = P(rms|g,bv,bs)
P(rms|g,bv,bs)
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Variable: G
Suspect is guilty
of the crime
Domain: {g,g}
Variable: Ct
There was
contact between
suspect and victim
Domain: {ct ,ct}
Variable: Ts
Transfer of traces
from victim
to suspect
Domain: {ts, ts}
Variable: Bs
Background of
the suspect
Domain: {bs,bs}
Variable: Ps
Other source of
traces on the
suspect
Domain: {ps, ps}
Variable: Cs
Trace from victim
is retrieved
from suspect
Domain: {cs,cs}
Variable: Ms
Retrieved trace
matches victim’s
Domain: {ms,ms}
Variable: RMs
Reported match
between retrieved
trace and victim’s
Domain: {rms,rms}
Variable: Tv
Transfer of traces
from suspect
to victim
Domain: {tv, tv}
Variable: Bv
Background of
the victim
Domain: {bv,bv}
Variable: Pv
Other source of
traces on the
victim
Domain: {pv, pv}
Variable: Cv
Trace from suspect
is retrieved
from victim
Domain: {cv,cv}
Variable: Mv
Retrieved trace
matches suspect’s
Domain: {mv,mv}
Variable: RMv
Reported match
between retrieved
trace and suspect’s
Domain: {rmv,rmv}
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Fig. 1 Structure of a variation of Aitken, Taroni and Garbolino’s cross-transfer Bayesian network. The
arrow Tv → Ts of the original network has been omitted from this version such that the same conditional
probability table can be used for both Tv and Ts and simplify the development of complete worked example
based on this network.
The remainder of the DAG shown in Figure 1 consists of the other variables
that affect the probability distributions of the hypothesis and evidence variables and
conditional independence relationships between them, represented in the manner de-
scribed above. For example, the variable Ct represents the proposition that there was
contact between victim and suspect. Aitken et. al. chose to condition Ct on the hy-
pothesis variable G. The variable Tv represents the proposition that there was a trans-
fer of biological trace material from suspect to victim. Tv has both G and Ct as its
parents. As such, G and Tv are not deemed to be probabilistically independent given
Ct because, according to Aitken et. al., the probability distribution of Tv is still af-
fected by the value of G even if Ct is known. Conversely, hypothesis variable G and
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G g g
Ct ct ct ct ct
P(ts|parent values) p1 p2 p3 p4
P(ts|parent values) 1− p1 1− p2 1− p3 1− p4
Table 1 Conditional probability table of Ts
evidence variable RMv are deemed conditionally independent given Tv, because, ac-
cording to the author of the model, the probability distribution of retrieval of trace
material matching the suspect from the victim is not affected by changes in the prob-
ability of the guilt hypothesis if it is already known whether biological trace material
was transferred from suspect to victim. The entire network is constructed by incre-
mentally considering the conditional independence relationships between variables
in this way.
Once the DAG of the BN has been constructed, conditional probability distri-
butions can be defined. As all variables in this BN are discrete, these probability
distributions can be specified in the form of a conditional probability table, such as
the one shown in Table 1 for variable Ts. This table contains a probability distribution
for Ts for each combination of value assignments of the parent variables of Ts in the
DAG: G and Ct . As such, there are 4 probability distributions for Ts, each defined by
a pair of probabilities pi, 1− pi.
3.1.3 Knowledge Acquisition Challenges
The development of accurate probabilistic models to apply the likelihood ratio ap-
proach to is challenging. The use of BNs aids the knowledge acquisition process
somewhat. In particular, the conditional independence model represented by a BN’s
DAG facilities the inclusion of a larger number of variables, because the conditional
independencies limit the number of variables that the probability distribution of each
variable in the model needs to be conditioned on. While the specification of condi-
tional independence relationships in the form of a BN’s DAG is not trivial, the DAG
has clear and generally understood meaning. Any given BN DAG can be validated,
e.g. through peer evaluation, or even cross examination in court.
Various authors have developed template BNs to evaluate specific types eviden-
tial reasoning problem. Aitken et. al.’s cross-transfer model is one example of such
a model. Other examples include BNs for assessing the value of two or more pieces
of trace evidence (i.e. the two or multiple trace problem) [29], BNs for assessing the
value of partial DNA matches in mixtures of DNA material [37] and BNs for evalu-
ating the value of finding potential traces of certain accelerants in fire incidents [9].
Recently, various authors have shown how the validation of evidence, a concern that is
typically tackled by means of argumentation based approaches [52], can be modelled
by means of BNs [25,32]. The BN DAGs presented in such work, or parts thereof,
can be reused and adapted to assess the value of evidence in practical problems.
Once the DAG of a BN is specified, conditional probability distributions for all
variables must be defined. This is particularly challenging for those variables whose
probability distributions are subjective, which means that the probability distribu-
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tions are based on an expert’s opinion or interpretation of data or domain theory.
Experts find it particularly difficult to commit to precise numeric values as proba-
bilities. Various approaches to allow experts to represent and reason with imprecise
probabilities have been developed, such as qualitative probabilistic networks [20],
semi-quantitative probabilistic networks [41] and credal networks [13]. The objec-
tive of such approaches is to enable experts to express both their knowledge and their
lack of knowledge, thereby capturing subjective probabilities more accurately.
Even if they are expressed in an imprecise manner, it is usually difficult to assess
the accuracy of subjective probability values by a person other than the expert who
produced them, because subjective probabilities tend to refer to situations that occur
infrequently. However, as illustrated by the discussion on R v T above, it is crucial that
the accuracy of statements about subjective probability can be assessed by various
people, such as the prosecution, the defence and the jurors. The remainder of this
paper is concerned with a method to enable that.
3.2 A Method For Validating Subjective Probabilities
The previous subsection established the need for a method for validating subjective
probabilities. As explained above, this approach must be able to capture the impre-
cision of an expert’s knowledge. It must also be able to capture an expert’s reasons
for stating certain subjective probability values in a way that others can understand
and attack, should they have reasons to do so. This subsection introduces such an
approach.
3.2.1 Argumentation About Subjective Probability
In order to tackle the challenges set out above, this paper proposes an argumenta-
tion based approach to scrutinise subjective probability distributions. According to
Schum, an argumentation based approach to evidential reasoning demonstrates that
a piece of evidence supports a given hypothesis by (i) breaking down the inference
steps between evidence and hypotheses into ones that can be tested and (ii) validating
each inference step by subjecting it to a series of tests designed to discover flawed rea-
soning [52]. Schum illustrates this with an example of evaluating witness testimony
of some observation that an event occurred. In this example, the argument pertaining
to the credibility of a witness’s testimony takes three steps, as follows:
Step 1: the witness states that the event occurred
the witness is truthful (veracity)
Step 2: ∴ the witness believes that the event occurred
the witness is unbiased (objectivity)
Step 3: ∴ the witness senses give evidence that the event occurred
the witness could observe what occurred (observational sensitivity)
∴ the event occurred
The veracity, objectivity and observational sensitivity propositions in this sequence
of arguments are then assessed by applying a series of test. In England and Wales, for
example, the Turnbull guidelines [5] define a set of criteria (distance of observation,
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time of day, length of observation, etc.) that provide a basis for assessing an eyewit-
ness’s observational sensitivity. More recently, this approach has been formalised by
means of argumentation schemes and critical questions [45,59]. Here, the argument
schemes provide templates for valid inferences from one or more premises to a con-
sequent/conclusion/claim, and the critical questions correspond to tests designed to
discover ways in which the inferences might be defeated.
As Schum has argued, an argumentation driven evidential reasoning approach
serves a different purpose than a Bayesian evidential reasoning approach [52]. Specif-
ically, the former aims to assess to what extent a claim can be demonstrated from
the evidence whereas the latter aims to assess how strongly evidence supports a hy-
pothesis (independent of prior beliefs). Put differently, the former specifies to what
extent reasoning holds up under scrutiny whereas the latter produces a numerical as-
sessment of how relative likelihoods are affected by evidence. One can incorporate
in a Bayesian model the same concerns introduced in argumentation models (such
as veracity, objectivity and observational sensitivity) in order to render the Bayesian
models more complete [32], or translate a Bayesian model to an argumentation model
for validation [35]. But their purpose and output remain different.
Subjective probabilities, as used in Bayesian models, are inherently claims about
the chances that situations occur under given conditions. Because such claims can
affect the outcome of a likelihood ratio analysis, they must be scrutinised. Indeed,
in England and Wales for example, the Crown Prosecutor must decide ”whether evi-
dence can be used in court and is reliable and credible” and ”must be satisfied there is
enough evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each defendant”,
before bringing a case to court [15]. As argued above, an argumentation approach is
specified specifically for that purpose. But this raises the question how arguments can
be formulated concerning claims concerning numerical values.
Earlier work has shown how significant features of conditional probability dis-
tributions can be expressed by means of constraints over the values in sets of prob-
ability distributions, such as those in a conditional probability table of a Bayesian
network [20]. Constraints can represent qualitative and quantitative information with
varying degrees of precision to be incorporated in a probabilistic model. For exam-
ple, constraints can define how a probability P(x|C) of proposition x, conditioned
on a variable C with an ordered domain, changes with increasing or decreasing val-
ues of C and they can define upper and lower boundaries on probability values. The
set of probabilities that satisfies a set of constraints believed to be true by an expert
represents that expert’s subjective probability. Therefore, constraints are employed as
claims in argumentation models that provide the validatable support for the subjective
probability the constraint entails. This implies that, in the type of models introduced
in this work, an expert’s argument based subjective probability is defined by the set
of probabilities that satisfies the set of constraints entailed by the arguments that are
believed to be true by the expert.
3.2.2 Constraint Problem and Analysis
In order to operationalise the intuitive definition of an expert’s argument based sub-
jective probability that was introduced in the previous subsection, it is necessary to
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introduce the concept of constraint satisfaction as it applies in this work. Specific
types of constraint are introduced in Section 5 and an extended example is shown in
6. A conventional constraint problem [55] is specified by a tuple 〈X,D,C〉, where
– X is a finite set of attributes {x1, . . . ,xn},
– D is a finite set of domains {D1, . . . ,Dn} with Di = {di1, . . . ,dini} for each at-
tribute xi, and
– C is a finite set of constraints, where each constraint c∈C over attributes xi, . . . ,x j
is a relation over the domains Di, . . . ,D j (i.e. c⊆ Di× . . .×D j).
A set of assignments {x1 : d1k1 , . . . ,xi : diki , . . . ,x j : d jk j , . . . ,xn : dnkn} is said to satisfy
a constraint c over the domains of xi, . . . ,x j if (diki , . . . ,d jk j) ∈ c. A set of assign-
ments is said to be a solution to the constraint problem 〈X,D,C〉 if it satisfies all the
constraints in C.
The constraint problems derived from argumentation models that define condi-
tional probability tables vary from conventional ones in two respects. Firstly, con-
straints are justified by arguments and only constraints justified by accepted argu-
ments affect the solution space. Specifically, if A is the set of arguments in the ar-
gumentation model from which the constraints are derived, j is a function C 7→ A
that maps each constraint to the argument that supports it, and A ⊆ A is the set of
arguments that are accepted by an individual, then a set of assignments is said to be a
solution to the constraint problem if it satisfies all the constraints in the set
C′ = {c ∈ C| j(c) ∈ A}
The set C′ is said to be the set of constraints admitted by A. Secondly, the domains
are not finite but the continuous interval [0,1]. For the purposes of this application, it
is necessary to find the entire solution space to the problem to allow local propagation
of the probability values.
In general, the problem of finding the solutions to a conventional constraint prob-
lem is NP-complete [19]. Although the problems of interest tend to be small, in the
sense that they involve a small number of variables, the number of constraint problem
attributes is proportional to dn where n is the number variables that the probability
distribution is conditioned on and d is the number of values of each variable. In prac-
tice, the variables of probabilistic models often denote propositions or come with
small domains. While larger, and even continuous, domains are possible, smaller do-
mains tend to be more appropriate for variables that have subjective probability dis-
tributions because the vagueness/ambiguity of knowledge concerning these variables
precludes larger, more precise, domains.
Solutions to these constraint problems can be computed in a number of ways.
Conventional constraint problem solvers, such as MINION [28], can be employed
provided an appropriate interface between the constraint solver and the argumentation
system exists. This interface serves two roles. Firstly, a constraint problem must be
defined for each set of accepted arguments, that is then solved from scratch. Secondly,
the interface must discretise the domains. Such an approach can lead to very large
solution spaces if the domains are discretised with fine granularity.
Dynamic constraint problems correspond to a sequence of conventional constraint
problems, where each constraint problem is a minor variation of its predecessor [56].
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Dynamic constraint problem solvers seek to improve on the performance of solving
these conventional constraint problems in sequence with a conventional constraint
solver by repairing the solution to one constraint problem with respect to the changes
in specification to the next constraint problem. In other words, these techniques aim
to reduce the required exploration of the search space for a new (set of) solution(s)
after a change in the specification of a constraint problem, by ignoring those parts of
the search space that could not possibly be affected by the change. Such techniques
could be applied here to compute the implications of changes in the set of accepted
arguments A.
Continuous constraint solvers, such as ECLiPSe [39] and RealPaver [31], are
designed to handle constraint problems with continuous domains without requiring
explicit discretisation of the domains in the problem specifications. They do so by
computing approximations of the solution space rather than enumerating all indi-
vidual solutions. For example, Sam-Haroud and Faltings have developed a method
to find all solutions to a continuous constraint problem by means of a hierarchical
decomposition of the solution space [51]. This approach has two important advan-
tages with regard to solving the constraint problem defined above. Firstly, it allows
for certain larger contiguous subspaces of the solution space that are either admitted
or rejected by constraints in their entirety to be represented by means of a compact
data structure. Secondly, it can represent a solution space with varying degrees of
granularity. The former feature enables a large set of solutions to be represented and
evaluated efficiently. The latter feature allows for the solver to scale its runtime and
storage requirements (as well as its precision) to the available resource.
For the purposes of this paper, any of the aforementioned continuous constraint
solvers can produce the spaces (or approximations thereof) of subjective conditional
probabilities that satisfy the constraints admitted by a set of arguments A that are ac-
cepted by an expert. These must be used to compute intervals of probabilities PA(X)
of propositions X admitted by the probabilistic model under the constraints that are
accepted by the set of arguments A. In general, finding PA(X) is an ongoing problem
being investigated in the area of interval probability theory [61]. However, proba-
bilistic evidential reasoning problems tend to be modelled by means of Bayesian
networks or simpler models that can be formalised by means of Bayesian networks.
Credal networks provide a means to propagate convex sets probabilities adhering to
the conditional independence relationships defined by means of a Bayesian network
[13], thereby allowing the computation of PA(X) once the space of conditional prob-
ability tables admitted by the constraints accepted by A have been found.
The ability to compute PA(X) allows the system to answer three types of queries
that pertain to the impact of the set of accepted arguments.
1. What is the value of evidence given the beliefs in A? As the value of evidence is
computed by the likelihood ratio, the value of a piece of evidence e with regard
to two hypotheses h1 and h2 given the beliefs in A is given by:
LRA(e|h1,h2) = PA(e|h1)PA(e|h2) (4)
LRA(e|h1,h2) is a convex set of likelihood ratios admitted by the argument set A.
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2. What is the impact of rejecting an argument a ∈ A? This can be computed as the
set of factors that convert the value of the evidence prior to rejecting a to the value
of the evidence after rejecting a:
LRA/a(e|h1,h2)
LRA(e|h1,h2) (5)
3. What is the impact of accepting a new argument a 6∈ A? Similar to query type 2,
this is computed as the set of factors that convert the value of the evidence prior
to accepting a to the value of the evidence after accepting a:
LRA∪{a}(e|h1,h2)
LRA(e|h1,h2) (6)
It is important to note that the valuations of evidence in (4), (5) and (6) result in in-
tervals of likelihood ratios instead of single values, because they are computed on
the basis of convex sets of probabilities. The sizes of the intervals express the degree
of uncertainty that remains in assessing the value of evidence due to the imprecise
nature of the subjective probabilities involved. All other things being equal, the more
the subjective probabilities can be constraint by arguments, the smaller the intervals
will tend to be. In court, any range of likelihood ratios that includes 1 should be inter-
preted to signify that the evidence does not provide clear support for one hypothesis
over another. If the entire interval is below or above 1, both the the weakest level
of support (i.e. the value closest to 1) and the size of the interval is important. The
former specifies the weakest level of support that can be claimed and the latter the
degree of doubt that remains in the mind of the expert.
3.2.3 Validating Subjective Probabilities
The previous subsection presented an approach to construct argument models that
define subjective probability distributions of probabilistic evidential reasoning mod-
els and to compute the implications of arguments on the value of evidence. This
subsection shows how such models facilitate validation of subjective probability dis-
tributions. To do so, it is necessary to examine how evidential reasoning models are
constructed.
A forensic scientists who is to assess the value of a piece of evidence may produce
a probabilistic model that enables him/her to do so. The methodology for producing
such a model is well understood and involves: (i) defining two hypothesis proposi-
tions (defence and prosecution hypotheses, or null and alternative hypotheses) and
the evidence proposition, (ii) identifying and defining the variables that affect the
likelihood of the hypotheses, (iii) specifying the conditional independence relation-
ships between the variables and (iv) specifying conditional probability distributions
[12]. The argumentation based approach extends step (iv): where conditional prob-
ability distributions are subjective, the forensic scientist (iv.a) produces arguments
supporting constraints over the conditional probability distributions, which are then
(iv.b) solved to produce a set of solutions representing the scientists opinion.
The arguments are constructed by instantiating argumentation schemes. While ar-
gument schemes define valid forms of argument, their instantiations with respect to
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a particular case may not be. Each argument scheme is associated with a set of criti-
cal questions that is designed to uncover reasons why instantiations of that argument
scheme may be invalid. Thus, the subjective probabilities used by the expert who
basis his/her assessment of the value of evidence on a probabilistic model contain-
ing those subjective probabilities are validated in three stages. First, the expert must
make the reasons for constraining subjective probabilities in certain ways explicit. As
this involves instantiating argumentation schemes, the expert is required to identify
how the prerequisite conditions for the claims made in this process are satisfied in
his/her opinion. Next, the expert applies the critical questions of each argumentation
scheme, with a view to assess whether the argument survives that test. Finally, an ex-
plicit model of an expert’s reasoning in deciding subjective probabilities is available,
in addition to the conventional probabilistic model and the assessment of the value
of evidence it entails. This allows the expert’s reasoning to be validated by others
far more easily than a mere set of numbers in a probabilistic model would. In other
words, it improves transparency. In a typical case, an expert’s assessments concerning
the value of a piece evidence, and by extension the associated argumentation models,
may be scrutinised at various stages: by peers of the expert before releasing the out-
come of an analysis, by the prosecutor prior to bringing the case to court and by the
defence in court. Again, the validity of the conditions of arguments and the critical
questions can be used as a guide in these subsequent validation processes.
3.3 Methodology For Defining Argumentation Schemes For Subjective Probabilities
The approach presented in this sections is crucially dependent upon the availability
to a suitably broad range of argumentation schemes with associated critical ques-
tions. Although a range of argumentation schemes exist that are relevant to evidential
reasoning [60], the use of argumentation schemes to construct arguments supporting
constraints over conditional probability distributions has not been studied yet in much
depth. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to defining such a set of argumenta-
tion schemes. This section discusses the methodology behind the definition of these
argumentation schemes.
Some limitations must be imposed on the types of argumentation schemes that
can be used. Because the purpose of this work is the validation of probabilistic mod-
els for assessing the value of evidence by experts, it is reasonable to assume that the
arguments stem from individuals that aim to approach the assessment of evidence
objectively and independently (even if they do not accomplish this). All claims con-
cerning subjective probabilities stem from one or more sources, such as a data set or
an expert’s opinion. In a legal setting, such sources constitute evidence that affect the
value assessment of the (direct) evidence. In other words, these sources are ancillary
evidence. It is important that all such ancillary evidence used in an assessment of the
value of evidence is catalogued and that its nature is identified because its reliability
affects the reliability of the resulting assessment. Therefore, Section 4 introduces a set
of argumentation schemes for so-called source-based arguments [60]. These source-
based arguments interpret the ancillary evidence and justify claims concerning the
nature of subjective probability distributions. These claims cannot necessarily be ex-
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pressed in the form of constraints. Therefore, a second set of constraint-justifying
argumentation schemes, presented in Section 5, specify how such claims or combi-
nations of such claims justify features of subjective probability distributions that can
be expressed by means of constraints. This two-level argument model and its relation
to a probabilistic model is presented in Figure 2.
Generally speaking, the source for a claim concerning a subjective probability dis-
tribution can be an expert’s personal judgement, one or more data sets, a theory or set
of first principles, or a combination of these sources [63]. Therefore, the source-based
argumentation schemes of Section 4 represent the way claims concerning probability
distributions can be derived from these sources and the critical questions cover the
assumptions and potential causes for errors in interpreting the sources.
The constraint-justifying argumentation schemes are somewhat harder to identify
as it is not feasible to capture all possible qualitatively significant features human
experts may express about subjective probability distributions. The objective of this
work is to define a sufficiently broad range of constraint-justifying argumentation
schemes to represent and compute subjective probabilities in real-world probabilistic
models for evidential reasoning. Over the past few decades, one strand of research in
uncertainty in AI has devised a wide range of knowledge representation formalisms
and associated inference mechanisms to represent and reason with subjective prob-
abilities, by capturing very specific types of probabilities that correspond to a kind
of features that is qualitatively significant and be identified by a human expert. An
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example of this is Adams’ ε-semantics [1], which enables the definition of a logic to
reason about propositions that have a probability close to 0 or 1. A separate strand
of research in the same field aims to devise knowledge representation formalisms
and inference mechanisms that are generic and can express any degree of uncertainty
about probability. An example of this is Cozman’s work on credal networks [13]. For
the purposes of of this work, the former strand of research is reviewed in Section 5 to
identify qualitatively significant features that may be exhibited by subjective proba-
bilities and redefines them as argumentation schemes with associated sets of critical
questions. In order to demonstrate that the range of argumentation schemes defined in
this way is both usable and sufficiently broad, Section 6 uses them to define the sub-
jective probabilities of a sophisticated probabilistic model from the forensic statistics
literature by means of argumentation models.
3.4 Notation
The argumentation schemes defined in the following sections specify subjective con-
ditional probability distributions of the form P(C|B), where B is a set of variables.
The set B is partitioned into a singleton containing B, a set Bc and a set X such that the
probability distributions assume the form P(C|B,Bc,X). The argumentation schemes
presented below impose constraints over probabilities P(C|B,bc,X), where bc is an
assignment of values of the variables in Bc. Specifically, the argumentation schemes
entail constraints over the probability distribution of C under certain conditions spec-
ified by assignments of B, given that variables Bc are assigned the values bc and for
any assignment x of the variables X that meet the requirements of argumentation
scheme. In what follows, the variable C is called the consequent variable, B is called
the antecedent variable and bc is called the context of the argumentation scheme.
4 Source-Based Argumentation Schemes & Critical Questions
This section presents a range of source-based argumentation schemes produced by
means of the methodology of Section 3.3.
4.1 Argument from Expert Opinion
As explained above, expert opinion is an important source of ancillary evidence for
subjective probability. As such, this section introduces a scheme for an argument from
an expert’s opinion about conditional probability distributions as ancillary evidence.
Argumentation scheme 1 is a variation of Walton’s argument from expert opinion [58]
The key difference between Walton’s argument from expert opinion and argumenta-
tion scheme 1 is that the generic notion of an assertion expressing expert opinion in
the former is substituted by more specific propositions concerning the variables in
{C,B} ∪Bc ∪X that manifests itself as a feature F of the probability distributions
P(C|B,Bc,X).
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Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from Expert Opinion
- E is an expert in domain D
- The variables in {C,B}∪Bc∪X and their interrelationships are
a part of domain D
- E asserts that the conditional probability distributions
P(C|B,bc,X) possess feature F
∴ The probability distribution P(C|B,Bc,X) may be constrained
by feature F
This more specific notion of an assertion allows for a more specific set of critical
questions:
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 1
1. Expertise Question: Is E credible as an expert in the relevant domain
(a) Is E credible as an expert in D?
(b) Is it credible for E to have an opinion concerning each of the variables
in {C,B}∪Bc∪X?
(c) Is it credible for E to have an opinion on the interrelationship between
the variable in B∪Bc with C?
(d) Is it credible for E to consider all relevant circumstances x that can
be described as combinations of assignments of the variables in X?
2. Trustworthiness Question: Is E trustworthy as an expert in D?
(a) Is E biased?
(b) Is E honest?
(c) Is E conscientious?
3. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
4. Domain Question: Is F in the relevant domain?
(a) Is F in domain D?
(b) Is it reasonable to classify the variables in {C,B}∪Bc∪X as belong-
ing to domain D?
5. Consistency Question: Is the assertion that the conditional probability dis-
tribution possess feature F consistent with assertions of other experts in
D?
6. Opinion Question: Did E’s assertion imply feature F?
This set of six critical questions cover the same issues as the critical questions
associated with Walton’s argument from expert opinion: expertise, trustworthiness,
backup evidence, domain, consistency and opinion. Here though, the expertise and
domain questions are elaborated because of the use of a more specific notion of the
assertion.
4.2 Argument from Data Set
Quantitative information about probability distributions typically stems from data
sets. Increasingly, forensic databases can provide information about the frequency of
occurrence of certain characteristics of objects potentially related to case: e.g. paint
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traces, glass fragments and shoe prints [10]. Argumentation scheme 2 aims to spec-
ify the structure of an argument from a data set. It is a source-based argumentation
scheme that is similar to argumentation scheme 1. However, instead of qualifying the
domain D that the data set S provides information about, the scheme specifies the
variables about which the data set provides information.
Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from Data Set or Model
- S is a data set or model that relates the variables in {B}∪Bc∪X
with C
- S implies a feature of F concerning the probabilities
P(C|B,bc,X)
∴ The probability distributions P(C|B,Bc,X) may be constrained
by feature F
Deriving information related to probability distributions from a data set is a non-
trivial task that can be prone to errors. Below is a list of critical questions that seek to
identify common errors in the use of arguments from data sets. The scope questions
assume the same role for argumentation scheme 2 that the expertise and domain ques-
tions assume with regard to argumentation scheme 1. Specifically, they aim to assess
whether the data set provides information on the relevant variables. The representa-
tiveness question aims to determine whether the population of the data set accurately
reflects the relevant features of the population under consideration in the evaluation
of evidence. If the population under consideration is a subset of the population rep-
resented by the data set, then it may possess unique characteristics that affect the
probability distribution. The precision question seeks to test whether the precision
feature F is not unwarranted given the data set it is extracted from. The opinion and
consistency questions assume the same role as in an argument from expert opinion.
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 2
1. Scope Question: Does data set S provide the necessary information to in-
form the probability distributions P(C|B,Bc,X)?
(a) Does data set S cover the variables in {C,B}∪Bc?
(b) Does data set S cover the interrelationships between the variables in
B∪Bc with C?
(c) Does data set S cover all variables in X necessary to identify the rel-
evant circumstances covered by feature F?
(d) Does data set S cover all relevant circumstances x that can be de-
scribed as combinations of assignments of the variables in X?
2. Representativeness Question: Is the population considered in data set S
representative for the population under investigation in the present case?
3. Precision Question: Is the volume and precision of data set S consistent
with the precision of feature F?
4. Opinion Question: Does data set S entail feature F?
5. Consistency Question: Is the observation of feature F in data set S consis-
tent with other data sets?
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4.3 Argument from First Principles
Domain theories can entail a broad range of features of probability distributions. First
principles can provide causal relationships between variables and qualitative diag-
nostic information. Where theories stem from or have been validated with empirical
data, they can also provide quantitative information on probability distributions. Ar-
gumentation scheme 3 is a template for an argument from first principles. It employs
the same structure as that of an argument from expert opinion, but the expert E has
been replaced by a theory T .
Argumentation scheme 3: Argument from First Principles
- T is a widely accepted theory concerning domain D
- The variables in {C,B}∪Bc∪X and their interrelationships are
a part of domain D
- T implies feature F concerning the probabilities P(C|B,bc,X)
∴ The probability distribution P(C|B,Bc,X) may be constrained
by feature F
The validation of a theory as a source of a feature of probability distributions is
somewhat different to the validation of expert opinion. The representativeness ques-
tions test whether the theory can be applied to the circumstances of the case and to
answer the questions at hand. The scope questions test whether the theory covers all
the variables of interest. The trustworthiness question aims to assess whether the ex-
perts who formulated T can be trusted. Finally, the consistency questions determine
whether the theory is consistent with views held in domain D.
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 3
1. Representativeness Question: Is T applicable to the case?
(a) Is the population under consideration for computing the conditional
probability distribution representative of the population to which the
theory is applicable?
(b) Is the theory applicable to the scenarios under consideration?
(c) Does theory T cover features such as F?
2. Scope Question: Does T provide the necessary information to inform the
probability distributions P(C|B,Bc,X)?
(a) Does theory T cover the variables in {C,B}∪Bc?
(b) Does theory T cover the interrelationships between the variables in
B∪Bc with C?
(c) Does theory T cover the relevant circumstances of the case, as they
can be represented by the variables in X?
3. Trustworthiness Question: Are the people who propose T trustworthy?
4. Backup Evidence Question: Is T assertion based on evidence?
5. Consistency Question: Is T consistent with the state of knowledge in the
domain?
(a) Is T a generally accepted theory by experts in D?
(b) Are there theories in D that conflict with T ?
6. Opinion Question: Does T entail feature F?
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4.4 Argument from Hybrid Sources
Conditional probability distributions do not necessarily stem from one type of source
only. Arguments from data or first principles often involve expert judgement in the
selection of the relevant data set or first principles and in their interpretation. This
subsection identifies how argumentation schemes can be composed to produce such
arguments from hybrid sources.
4.4.1 Expert Judgement in Source Selection
An argument from a data set or first principles often relies on expert judgement in
the selection of the data set or first principles to be applied. The arguments made in
such a case can be represented by combining the above argumentation schemes for
arguments from a data set and arguments from first principles with Walton’s argument
from expert opinion. An example can illustrate this. Consider a situation where an
expert proposes that a data set S is suitable to inform probability distributions of C
conditioned on {B} ∪Bc ∪X. This can be formulated as an argument from expert
opinion (in Walton’s generic form):
- E is an expert in domain D
- E asserts that S is a data set that relates the variables in {B}∪
Bc∪X with C
- The selection of a suitable data set concerning the variables in
{C,B}∪Bc∪X is within E’s area of expertise D
∴ S is a data set that relates the variables in {B}∪Bc∪X with C (*)
The consequent of this argument has the form of the antecedent of an argument from
a data set (where the link is identified by means of a (*) symbol):
- S is a data set that relates the variables in {B}∪Bc∪X with C (*)
- S implies a feature of F concerning the probabilities
P(C|B,bc,X)
∴ The probability distributions P(C|B,Bc,X) may be constrained
by feature F
4.4.2 Argument from Expert Judgement
Even if data sets or first principles fail to meet the requirements of sections 4.2 and
4.3 respectively, they may still inform expert opinion. Based on such data sets and/or
first principles, an expert may produce a conservative estimate of the relationships
that exist between variables and formulate a constraint accordingly. To represent such
arguments, arguments from data sets, arguments from first principles or a combina-
tion of both can be constructed that specify features on the basis of which an expert
formulates a conservative estimate. This requires a new argumentation scheme for an
argument from expert judgement:
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Argumentation scheme 4: Argument from Expert Judgement
- E is an expert in domain D
- The variables in {C,B}∪Bc∪X and their interrelationships are
a part of domain D
- The probability distributions P1 is constrained by feature F1
...
- The probability distributions Pn is constrained by feature Fn
- E asserts that if the probability distribution P1 is constrained
by feature F1 and . . . and the probability distribution Pn is
constrained by feature Fn, then the probability distributions
P(C|B,Bc,X) possess feature F
∴ The probability distribution P(C|B,Bc,X) may be constrained
by feature F
The application of this scheme is best illustrated by means of an example. Con-
sider a situation where a data set S relates the variables in {B}∪Y with C, but where
conditional probability distributions P(C|B,Y,X) need to be specified. In this case,
the following argument from a data set can be formulated:
- S is a data set that relates the variables in {B}∪Y with C
- S implies a feature of F concerning the probabilities
P(C|B,bc,Y )
∴ The probability distributions P(C|B,Y) may be constrained by
feature F
(A)
A feature F that affects probability distributions of the form P(C|B,Y) does not nec-
essarily generalise to probability distributions of the form P(C|B,Y,X). The reason
for this is that a constraint that is valid in any set of circumstances defined by an
assignment y of the variables in Y is not necessarily valid in each of the more spe-
cific circumstances that can be defined by an assignment x of the variables in X∪Y.
However, an expert may argue, for example, that the variables in X do not affect the
probability of C. This judgement entails the feature F expressed in proposition (A).
Therefore, the following argument would apply in this example:
- E is an expert in domain D
- The variables in {C,B}∪Bc∪X∪Y and their interrelationships
are a part of domain D
- E asserts that a feature of type F concerning the probability dis-
tributions describing the relationship between variables B and C
given circumstances described by Y generalise to all possible
circumstances that can be described by the variables in X∪Y
(B)
∴ The probability distributions P(C|B,Y,X) may be constrained
by feature F
Here, note that proposition (B) can be reformulated as ”E asserts that if the prob-
ability distribution P(C|B,Y) is constrained by feature F then conditional probability
distributions P(C|B,Y,X) possess feature F”, thereby assuming the form of the final
antecedent of argumentation scheme 4.
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5 Constraint-Justifying Argumentation Schemes & Critical Questions
The previous section introduced a number of argumentation schemes that justify
claims about of probability distributions. In this section, schemes are introduced that
identify ways of translating these claims into specific features that correspond to con-
straints. The constraints can operationalise the features at different levels of precision.
As such, this section is organised into three subsections corresponding to different
categories of precision.
In the process of justifying constraints, a number of decisions are made. These
decisions take the form of additional propositions in the antecedents of the argu-
mentation schemes. The critical questions associated with argumentation schemes
introduced in this section largely aim to validate these new decisions. Where this
is the case, the critical questions are self-explanatory and no further explanations
are provided. As is shown, argumentation schemes representing constraints of higher
precision tend to involve a larger set of decisions and therefore a broader range of
critical questions.
5.1 Arguments for Qualitative Features
This subsection introduces a number of argumentation schemes that justify common
but weak relationships over probability values. These relationships are weak because
they imply constraints that are not particularly restrictive. However, this makes them
relatively uncontroversial and easy to commit to by experts.
5.1.1 Arguments for Qualitative Influences
Qualitative influences stem from qualitative certainty networks [43], an abstraction of
a variety of probabilistic models. In their most basic form, qualitative influences con-
strain probability distributions of the form P(C|B, . . .), where B and C are variables
with totally ordered domains. Intuitively speaking, a variable B is said to positively
(negatively) influence C if an increase in the probability of higher values of B implies
an increase (decrease) in the probability of higher values of C. argumentation scheme
5 specifies the conditions for a positive (negative) qualitative influence for variables
with Boolean domains (i.e. propositions).
Argumentation scheme 5: [Positive|Negative] Qualitative Influence
- B has a [non-negative|non-positive] effect on the likelihood of C
∴ P(c|b,x)[≥ | ≤]P(c|b,x) for any assignment x of the variables in
X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 5
1. Is the direction of the influence correct?
2. Is the direction of influence dependent on context assumptions?
(a) Are there assignments x of the variables in X where the direction of
the effect of B on the likelihood of C is reversed?
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(b) Are there circumstances where the direction of the effect on B on the
likelihood C is reversed?
In the cross-transfer model, it can be argued that G has a non-negative effect on
Ct . A justification for this argument is that the type of crime scenario described by g
is enabled by contact between suspect and victim ct . More precisely, certain variants
of scenarios involving g require contact (ct ). It can also be argued that Pv (Ps) has a
non-positive effect on Cv (Cs). A justification for this argument is that the presence of
another source of the same type of trace material being investigated as evidence (pv
or ps) reduces the proportion of trace material related to the crime (if any is present)
and, therefore, the probability of recovering it (cv or cs).
Renooij et. al. [49] have extended this concept of qualitative influences that are
valid in all circumstances with one that is defined to be applicable to certain pre-
specified circumstances only. Context-specific qualitative influences come with a
context defined by a set of value assignments of variables the probability distribu-
tions are conditioned on. They constrain the probability distributions that satisfy the
context only.
More formally, argumentation scheme 6 defines a context-specific qualitative in-
fluence of a variable B on a variable C, where the probability distribution of C is
conditioned on B and a set of variables Bc. The qualitative influence defined in the
argumentation scheme is only deemed valid in those situations where the variables in
Bc take the set of variable-value assignments bc. bc is said to be the context of the
qualitative influence.
Argumentation scheme 6: [Positive|Zero|Negative] Qualitative Influence
- B has a [non-negative|no|non-positive] effect on the likelihood
of C given an assignment bc of the variables in Bc
∴ P(c|b,bcx)[≥ | = | ≤]P(c|b,bcx) for any assignment x of the
variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 6
1. Is the direction of the influence correct?
2. Is the direction of influence dependent on context assumptions not in-
cluded in bc?
(a) Are there assignments x of the variables in X where, given the context
bc, the direction of the effect of B on the likelihood of C is reversed?
(b) Are there circumstances where, given the context bc, the direction of
the effect on B on the likelihood C is reversed?
Note that scheme 6 is scrutinised by the same set of critical questions as those of
scheme 5, but that the scrutiny is specific to the context of interest.
In the cross-transfer model, it can be argued that the possible existence of another
source of trace material on the victim (Pv) has no effect on the probability of retrieving
trace material from the victim’s body belonging to the suspect (Cv) if there has been
no transfer of trace material from suspect to victim (tv). This can be justified by an
argument that:
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i. Pv can dilute the amount of suspect related trace material transferred to the victim
only, and
ii. tv is the only source of suspect related trace material transferred to the victim.
5.1.2 Arguments for Combined Effects: Additive Synergy
Qualitative influences describe the impact of the probability distribution of one vari-
able on another. Synergies specify how different influences with a common conse-
quence relate to one another. In other words, they describe qualitatively significant
features of ”intercausal reasoning” [62]. Synergies involve three variables B1, B2 and
C, such that there exist qualitative influences from B1 to C and from B2 to C. In
the literature on qualitative probabilistic reasoning, two types of synergies have been
identified: additive synergies and product synergies.
As defined in argumentation scheme 7, additive synergies express how the com-
bined effect of two causes compares to the sum of the constituent effects. If the com-
bined effect of the two antecedent variables is greater than the sum of the individual
effects, then there is said to be a positive additive synergy between the influences of
B1 and B2 on C. Conversely, if there is a negative additive synergy, then the combined
effect of the parent variables is smaller than the sum of the constituent effects.
Argumentation scheme 7: [Positive|Negative] Additive Synergy
- b1 has a non-negative effect on the likelihood of c
- b2 has a non-negative effect on the likelihood of c
- the combined effect of b1 and b2 on the likelihood of c is
[greater|smaller] than the sum of the constituent effects of b1 and
b2
∴ P(c|b1,b2,x)+P(c|b1,b2,x) [≥ | ≤]
P(c|b1,b2,x)+P(c|b1,b2,x) for any assignment x of the
variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 7
1. Does b1 have a non-negative (non-positive) effect on the likelihood of c
(tested by the critical questions of Argumentation scheme 5)?
2. Does b2 have a non-negative (non-positive) effect on the likelihood of c
(tested by the critical questions of Argumentation scheme 5)?
3. Is the underlying feature an additive synergy?
(a) Does the underlying feature concern an effect on the likelihood of c?
(b) Does the underlying feature compare the effect of the influences iso-
lation of one another with the effect of the combined influences?
4. Is the direction of the additive synergy correct?
(a) Does a change in the likelihood of b1 (b2) have a [greater|lesser] effect
on the likelihood of c with higher values of b2 (b1)?
(b) Are there assignments x of the variables in X where the direction of
the additive synergy is not [positive|negative]?
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Note that argumentation scheme 7 specifies non-context-specific positive qualita-
tive influences of Bi on C. If either b1 or b2 has a non-positive effect on the likelihood
of c, but not both, then the inequation signs need to be reversed (from [≥ | ≤] to
[≤ | ≥]). If both b1 and b2 have a non-positive effect on the likelihood of c, then the
constraint applies as it is introduced in scheme 7. The scheme can also be generalised
to context-specific influences by restricting the constraints to the relevant contexts.
In the cross-transfer model, it can be argued that the guilt hypothesis g and contact
between suspect and victim ct both have a non-negative effect on the transfer of traces
from suspect to victim tv. In the scenarios that Aitken et. al. have in mind, contact
between suspect and victim in the context of the guilt scenario is that of a violent
struggle. Specifically, the authors have cases of alleged rape or homicide in mind [3].
It is reasonable to argue that the transfer of trace material between two people is more
likely in a violent struggle as part of a violent crime, than it is in most (albeit not all)
scenarios of contact between this two people. This implies that the combined effect
of g and ct on tv is greater than the sum of the constituent effects and, hence, that
there is a positive additive synergy between the two effects.
5.1.3 Arguments for Explaining In/Away: Product Synergy
Intuitively, a product synergy describes whether a pair of explanations concerning
the same consequent variable reinforce one another (”explaining in”) or undermine
one another (”explaining away”). As defined in argumentation scheme 8, given a
qualitative influence of B1 on C and of B2 on C, a positive product synergy describes
how an increase in the likelihood of b1 (b2) affects the likelihood of b2 (b1). As
with additive synergies, the argumentation scheme can be extended to accommodate
negative qualitative influences and context-specific ones.
Argumentation scheme 8: [Positive|Negative] Product Synergy
- b1 has a non-negative effect on the likelihood of c
- b2 has a non-negative effect on the likelihood of c
- the explanations b1 and b2 [reinforce|undermine] one another
∴ P(c|b1,b2,x)P(c|b1,b2,x) [≥ | ≤] P(c|b1,b2,x)P(c|b1,b2,x)
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 8
1. Does b1 have a non-negative (non-positive) effect on the likelihood of c
(tested by the critical questions of Argumentation scheme 5)?
2. Does b2 have a non-negative (non-positive) effect on the likelihood of c
(tested by the critical questions of Argumentation scheme 5)?
3. Is the underlying feature a product synergy?
(a) Does the underlying feature concern the plausibility of b1 and b2 as
explanations of c?
(b) Does the underlying feature compare the plausibility of b1 (b2) in the
absence of b2 (b1) with the plausibility of b1 (b2) in the presence of
b2 (b1)?
4. Is the direction of the product synergy correct?
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(a) Does an increase in the likelihood of b1 (b2) [increase|decrease] the
likelihood of b2 (b1)?
(b) Does a decrease in the likelihood of b1 (b2) [decrease|increase] the
likelihood of b2 (b1)?
(c) Are there assignments x of the variables in X where the direction of
the product synergy is not [positive|negative]?
In the cross-transfer model, an additional edge Tv→ Ts or Ts→ Tv may be added
to model correlation between transfers of trace material in either direction for known
values of Ct . Consider an alteration of the model where there are three edges to Ts:
G→ Ts, Ct → Ts and Tv→ Ts1. In this version, the context that there has been contact
between victim and suspect, allows two remaining explanations for trace transfer
from victim to suspect ts:
g : the scenario where the suspect is guilty of the crime under consideration, and
tv : transfer of traces from suspect to victim.
One could argue that these explanations ought to reinforce one another: i.e. g is more
likely an explanation for ts given tv and tv is more likely an explanation for ts given g.
5.2 Arguments for Extreme Probabilities
Probabilistic models designed for evidential reasoning with legal and forensic appli-
cations commonly feature probabilities that are equal or fairly close to 0 or 1. Such
extreme probabilities are important to probabilistic reasoning in general, so much so
that a number of authors have devised specific qualitative calculi to represent and
reason with very large and very small probability values. Examples include Adams’
ε-semantics [1,44], Goldszmidt and Pearl’s system-Z+ [30] and Spohn’s ordinal con-
ditional functions [53]. The reasons that justify incorporating extreme probabilities in
conditional probability tables vary considerably. This section identifies some of the
most important ones.
5.2.1 Arguments for Sufficient and Necessary Conditions
In a probabilistic model, sufficient and necessary are relevant to any model contain-
ing a variable C conditioned on one or more variables B such that an assignment b
of the variables in B constitutes a sufficient or necessary condition for C to assume a
particular value. In this section, argument schemes for sufficient and necessary condi-
tions are defined for variables C that represent a proposition (though the idea is easily
extended to variables with larger domains). If b is a sufficient condition, it is known
that c is always true if b is true, and hence that P(c|b) = 1. This is specified in argu-
mentation scheme 9. In the cross-transfer example, it can be argued that the transfer
to trace material from suspect to victim (tv) and the absence of a secondary source of
trace material of the same type (pv) is a sufficient condition for a forensic examiner
1 This version of the model is not included in Figure 1 to make the model easier to understand as the
basis for demonstrating this work.
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to retrieve trace material from the victim belonging to the suspect (cv) because ”there
is no biological material from elsewhere” [3].
Argumentation scheme 9: Arguments for Sufficient Conditions
- b is a sufficient condition for c
∴ P(c|b,x) = 1
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 9
1. Might b be a necessary condition rather than a sufficient condition?
2. Is it possible for b to be true and c to be false?
If b is a necessary condition, it is known that c is always false if b is false, and
hence that P(c|¬b) = 0. This is specified in argumentation scheme 10. The cross-
transfer model contains a number of examples of necessary conditions. Contact be-
tween suspect and victim (ct ) is a necessary condition for the transfer of trace material
both from suspect to victim (tv) and from victim to suspect (ts), because according
to Aitken et. al. ”if there is no contact, it is assumed that there is no transfer (i.e. no
secondary transfer)” [3]. These transfers of trace material (tv and ts) are themselves
necessary conditions for the retrieval of transferred traces from victim or suspect (cv
and cs) because no crime-related trace material belonging to the suspect/victim could
be retrieved from the victim/suspect if there was no transfer of trace material between
both [3].
Argumentation scheme 10: Arguments for Necessary Conditions
- b is a necessary condition for c
∴ P(c|b) = 0
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 10
1. Might b be a sufficient condition rather than a necessary condition?
2. Is it possible for b to be false and c to be true?
5.2.2 Arguments for Definitions
If b is both a sufficient and necessary condition for c, it is said that b defines c. This
situation is described in argumentation scheme 11.
Argumentation scheme 11: Argument from Definition
- c if and only if b
∴ P(c|b) = 1
P(c|¬b) = 0
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 11
1. Is each b ∈ b a necessary condition for c?
2. Is b a sufficient condition for c?
3. Is it possible for b to be true and c to be false?
4. Is it possible for a b ∈ b to be false and c to be true?
Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty In The Likelihood Ratio Approach To Evidential Reasoning 31
In the cross-transfer model, the presence of trace material from another source of
the same type as that under investigation (pv and ps) on the victim/suspect is defined
in terms of the background of the victim and the suspect (Bv and Bs). The variables
Bv and Bs provide a means to explain the source of the presence of non-crime related
trace-material and formulate defence and prosecution hypotheses.
5.2.3 Arguments for Observations/Classifications
A common feature of probabilistic models of evidential reasoning is that they may
contain variables representing the observation or classification of a circumstance or
set of circumstances denoted by other variables. As with an ”Argument from Defini-
tion”, an ”Argument from Observation/Classification” requires a particular situation
defined by a tuple of value-assignments b of the variables in B that ought to be ob-
served or classified as c. Unlike the application of a sufficiently precise definion,
however, the acts of observation and classification are subject to errors. Typically,
there is a small probability α that a situation that does not satisfy b is incorrectly
observed or classified as c (aka Type I error) and a small probability β that a situa-
tion that does satisfy b is incorrectly observed or classified as not satisfying c (aka
Type II error). Argumentation scheme 12 defines such an Argument from Observa-
tion/Classification.
Argumentation scheme 12: Argument from [Observation|Classification]
- The condition defined by b is [observed|classified] as c
- The type I error of classifying c is less than or equal to α
∴ P(c|¬b)≤ α
- The condition defined by b is [observed|classified] as c
- The type II error of classifying c is less than or equal to β
∴ P(c|b)≥ 1−β
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 12
1. Is the relationship between the variables in B and C one of
[observation|classification]?
(a) Can c be fully explained by b or type I error? Are there situations
other than b or type I error that explain c?
(b) Can c be fully explained by the absence of b or type II error? Are
there situations other than the absence of b or type II error that ex-
plain c?
2. Is there evidence to support the type I error? Is there evidence to support
the type II error?
3. Are there reasons to believe that the probability of type I error is greater
than α? Are there reasons to believe that the probability of type II error is
greater than β?
In the cross-transfer model, this argumentation scheme can be applied to the act of
reporting trace matches, for trace evidence collected from the victim and the suspect.
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More precisely, the reported trace matches on victim (rmv) and suspect (rms) are
observations of actual trace matches on victim (mv) and suspect (ms) respectively. In
the process of observing the existence or absence of a match, Argumentation Scheme
12 enables the specification of an upper bound α on the probability that a match is
reported where there is none (false positive) and an upper bound β on the probability
that the absence of a match is reported where there is one (false negative).
5.2.4 Arguments for closed-world Assumptions
Intuitively, a closed-world assumption with regard to a proposition implies that all
explanations for that proposition have been incorporated in our knowledge base or
model. Thus, if none of the explanations in the model are applicable, the proposi-
tion is false. In other words, a closed-world assumption is an explicit statement that
negation-as-failure can be applied in the model with respect to a given proposition
[48].
In probabilistic models for evidential reasoning, the equivalent of committing to a
closed-world assumption is to set the probability of a proposition to close to 0 in con-
ditions where the model has no explicit reason to justify the proposition. Again, this is
a common feature of a probabilistic model, but the corresponding assumption is often
not accounted for. Argumentation scheme 13 provides a means for constructing ar-
guments for making closed-world assumptions. Note that the argumentation scheme
employs qualitative influences (context-specific or context-free ones) for describing
reasons for accepting a proposition because qualitative influences are the weakest
(least constraining) form of probabilistic justification for a proposition in this set of
constraint-justifying argumentation schemes. It can be shown that all other arguments
for increasing the probability of a proposition entail a qualitative influence.
Argumentation scheme 13: Argument from closed-world Assumption
- All reasonably plausible qualitative influences explaining c have
been accounted for
- The probability of c occurring in the absence of any of the rea-
sons accounted for less than or equal to ε
∴ P(c|b) ≤ ε for any assignment b that does not constitute an ex-
planation of c
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 13
1. Is it possible to justify the absence of reasons for c other than those ac-
counted with an error no greater than ε?
2. Is there any evidence to support the assertion that there are no alternative
explanations for c other than those accounted for in the model?
3. Are there any explanations for c for which there is no corresponding qual-
itative influence or sufficient condition?
4. Is there any evidence to support that the error margin is not greater than
ε?
5. In the absence of any explanation for c, is there any reason to believe that
the probability of c could be greater than ε?
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In the cross-transfer model, one might argue that a closed-world assumption could
be made with regards to contact ct and that the guilt scenario g is the most plausible
explanation for ct . This is not to say that contact is impossible in scenarios where
the suspect is not guilty. In defining the closed-world assumption, a (conservative)
upper bound must be selected representing the probability ε that there is a random
contact between the suspect and the victim. A closed-world assumption is justified if
it is reasonable to say that ε is low (e.g. Aitken et. al. use ε = 0.01 in this model).
Whether this is a reasonable assumption depends on the circumstances of the victim
and the suspect, and the critical questions seek to test this. For example, if victim and
suspect were to live or be employed in relative proximity of one another, that would
be a reasonable alternative explanation (tested by critical question 2), invalidating the
closed-world assumption.
5.3 Arguments for Quantitative Features
This subsection presents a number of argumentation schemes that can express con-
straints that contain absolute quantities affecting the probability distributions. With
such constraints, features of probability distributions can be expressed in greater pre-
cision. However, being more precise, such constraints tend to involve a greater num-
ber of decisions by the expert committing to the underlying argument. Therefore,
the arguments tend to need to be subjected to larger sets of critical questions. Such
arguments also tend to be more controversial.
5.3.1 Arguments for Boundary Conditions
Based on a data set, judgement or a combination thereof, an expert may argue to im-
pose a boundary condition on the probability of a particular proposition under certain
conditions. By means of argumentation scheme 14 an upper or lower bound of the
conditional probability of a proposition c given b, where b is an assignment of values
to a subset of the variables that C is conditioned on, is defined and justified. The key
implication of defining a boundary condition is that it holds for any combination of
variable assignments of other variables that C is conditioned on, because the bound-
ary condition is specified with regards to the conditional probability distribution in
the probabilistic model.
Argumentation scheme 14: Argument for Boundary Condition
- The [lower|upper] bound on the probability of c given b is p
∴ p[≤ | ≥]P(c|b,x) for any assignment x of the variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 14
1. Is it possible to infer that [a lower bound is greater than 0|an upper bound
is smaller than 1] given the data at hand?
2. Is there any evidence to support the boundary condition?
3. Where the boundary condition relies on the relative occurrence of two
events:
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(a) Are the two events related in such a way that a relative comparison is
possible?
(b) If not, are the absolute frequencies of the two events known?
4. Does a boundary condition hold for each of the possible circumstances
that can be described by assignments x of X?
5. Are there reasons to believe that the [lower|upper] bound is
[smaller|greater] than p under certain circumstances? Can those circum-
stances be described by assignments x of X?
5.3.2 Arguments for Order-of-Magnitude Influences
Qualitative influences as specified above define the direction of change of the proba-
bility of a proposition in response to a change in the probability of a second proposi-
tion that the first is conditioned on. Parsons has demonstrated how that concept can
be extended to define magnitudes of change rather than just the direction of change
[41]. In particular, he demonstrates the use of a relative order-of-magnitude calculus
that expresses magnitudes by means of pairwise comparison constraints [17,46], and
an absolute order-of-magnitude calculus that expresses magnitudes by means of nu-
meric intervals [16], to express (vague) semi-quantitative changes in probability to
represent and propagate semi-quantitative expressions of probability. Argumentation
schemes 15 and 16 specify argumentation schemes supporting influences with mag-
nitudes expressed by finite differences, which correspond to the absolute order-of-
magnitude calculus employed by Parsons. More specifically, argumentation scheme
15 defines context-free order-of-magnitude influences and argumentation scheme 16
context-specific ones.
Argumentation scheme 15: Argument from Context-Free Order-of-
Magnitude Influence
- B has an effect on the likelihood of C of magnitude m
- Magnitude m is defined by a finite difference between l and u
∴ l≤P(c|b,x)−P(c|b,x)≤ u for any assignment x of the variables
in X
Argumentation scheme 16: Argument for Context-Specific Order-of-
Magnitude Influence
- B has an effect on the likelihood of C of magnitude m, given an
assignment bc of the variables in Bc
- Magnitude m is defined by a finite difference between l and u
∴ l ≤ P(c|b,bc,x)−P(c|b,bc,x) ≤ u for any assignment x of the
variables in X
In these schemes, l and u correspond to the lower and upper bounds on the magni-
tude of the influence. As these order-of-magnitude influences are a generalisation of
qualitative influences that allow a more precise definition of an influences effect, these
boundary conditions identify the type of qualitative influence this order-of-magnitude
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influence corresponds to. If l < u ≤ 0, the argument’s antecedent implies a negative
qualitative influence and if 0≤ l < u, it implies a positive qualitative influence.
Arguments for order-of-magnitude influences provide a means to quantify an ex-
pert’s beliefs with greater precision. But as such beliefs can take many different forms
and be expressed in different ways, a variety of schemes can be proposed. Consider,
for instance, the order-of-magnitude calculus NAPIER, which employs rounded log-
arithms to express the magnitude of a number [38]. In the spirit of this approach,
the magnitude of an influence can be expressed by means of a lower and upper
bound on the factor by which a probability increases or decreases. Thus, an argu-
ment for an order-of-magnitude influence can also be specified as in scheme 17.
Here, 0 ≤ l < u ≤ 1 corresponds to a negative qualitative influence and 1 ≤ l < u
to a positive qualitative influence.
Argumentation scheme 17: Argument for Context-Specific Order-of-
Magnitude Influence
- B has an effect on the likelihood of C of magnitude m, given an
assignment bc of the variables in Bc
- Magnitude m is defined by a factor between l and u
∴ l ≤ P(c|b,bc,x)
P(c|b,bc,x) ≤ u for any assignment x of the variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 15,16,17
1. If the magnitude is expressed as l < u ≤ 0 using scheme 15 or 16, or as
0 ≤ l < u ≤ 1 using scheme 17, does B have a non-positive effect on C?
If the magnitude is expressed as 0 ≤ l < u using scheme 15 or 16, or as
1≤ l < u using scheme 17, does B have a non-negative effect on C? (tested
by the critical questions of Argumentation scheme 5)
2. Is there evidence to support the specification of the magnitude of an influ-
ence?
– Is the claim supported by evidence?
– Does this evidence concern a magnitude of effect?
– Does the claim stipulate the boundary conditions of the claim?
3. Is there a set of circumstances x that can be described by X in which the
magnitude of the effect is not in the range m given bc: i.e. where the effect
is:
(a) greater than m (i.e. below l in the case of a non-positive effect or
above u in case of a non-negative effect), or
(b) smaller than m (i.e. above u in the case of a non-positive effect or
below l in case of a non-negative effect)?
4. Is there a necessary condition for the magnitude of the influence of B on
C to be m that is not included in bc?
For example, an expert in trace evidence may produce an argument on the basis
of his/her understanding of the nature of the trace material involved in the case, the
events that occurred in the alleged crime and data on random trace transfers and
subsequent shedding and data concerning the whereabouts of suspect and victim (i.e.
an argument from expert judgement as defined in scheme 4), that trace transfer is a
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great deal more likely under the guilt hypothesis (g) than it would be if the suspect is
a random person unrelated to the crime (g). The expert may feel confident enough to
quantify what he/she means by ”a great deal more likely” and suggest that to say ”10
times more likely” would be a conservative estimate. In such a situation, scheme 17
can be applied to express the views of the expert.
5.3.3 Arguments for Second Order Influences
As shown in earlier work, context-specific order-of-magnitude influences can be em-
ployed to express qualitatively significant ”second order influences” [33]. These are
relationships between a set of variable assignments and a first order influence, affect-
ing the presence or magnitude of effect of the latter. A disabler, defined by means
of argumentation scheme 18 describes conditions in which a first order effect does
not hold. In other words, the negation of a disabler is a necessary condition for the
first order influence to have effect. An enabler, described by means of argumentation
scheme 19 describes conditions that must hold for a first order influence to have ef-
fect. In other words, the enabler is a necessary condition for the first order influence
to have effect.
Argumentation scheme 18: Argument for Disabler
- B can have an effect on the likelihood of C
- bc is a disabler of the effect of B on the likelihood of C
∴ P(c|b,bc,x) = P(c|b,bc,x) for any assignment x of the
variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 18
1. Can bc not be said to have a direct effect on C rather than a second order
effect?
2. Is the effect of bc to block the influence of B on C or merely to inhibit it?
3. Does the disabling effect assume any circumstances that are explained by
variables in X rather than bc?
Argumentation scheme 19: Argument for Enabler
- B can have an effect on the likelihood of C
- bc is an enabler of the effect of B on the likelihood of C
∴ P(c|b,bc,x) = P(c|b,bc,x) for any assignment bc of the
variables of Bc that satisfies ¬bc and any assignment x of the
variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 19
1. Can bc not be said to have a direct effect on C rather than a second order
effect?
2. Is there no influence of B on C in the absence of bc, or is the effect of bc
merely to amplify an influence?
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3. Does the enabling effect assume any circumstances that are explained by
variables in X rather than bc?
The cross-transfer model does not contain a good example of an enabler/disabler.
It can be argued that contact between victim and suspect (ct ) is an enabler to the effect
of the guilt hypothesis (G) on transfer of trace material from suspect to victim (Tv).
Specifically, the guilt hypothesis makes transfer of trace material from suspect to vic-
tim more likely, but only if there was contact between victim and suspect. However,
that line of reasoning is awkward. ct is really just a necessary condition for tv rather
than a necessary condition on the effect of G on Tv.
An enabler or disabler specifies a necessary condition on an influence between
variables and need not make the consequent proposition impossible under certain
conditions. In an extensions of the cross-transfer model that specialises in specific
crimes, it may be possible to include an additional variable W that differentiates the
ways in which a crime could have been perpetrated. Some ways in which the crime
could have been perpetrated might justify an increased likelihood of trace transfer and
some might not. Here, there are no values of W that constitute a necessary condition
on tv, but under certain values of W , the value of G the probability of tv would not be
affected.
Enablers and disablers are qualitative second order influences on order-of-
magnitude first order influences. It is also possible to define second order influences
that impact on the magnitude of a first order effect by means of argumentation scheme
20. An inhibitor describes conditions in which a first order influence has a reduced
effect compared to conditions in which the inhibitor does not hold. An amplifier de-
scribes conditions in which a first order influence has a stronger effect compared to
conditions in which the amplifier does not hold.
Argumentation scheme 20: Argument for [Inhibitor|Amplifier]
- B can have an effect on the likelihood of C
- bc is an inhibitor of the effect of B on the likelihood of C with
magnitude m
- Magnitude m is defined by a magnitude differential between l
and u (with [l < u < 0|0 < l < u])
∴ l ≤ ∣∣P(c|b,bc,x)−P(c|b,bc,x)∣∣ − ∣∣P(c|b,bc,x)−P(c|b,bc,x)∣∣
≤ u for any assignment bc of the variables of Bc that satisfies
¬bc and for any assignment x of the variables in X
Critical Questions for argumentation scheme 20
1. Can bc not be said to have a direct effect on C rather than a second order
effect?
2. Is there an influence of B on C in the [presence|absence] of bc?
3. Is there evidence to support the magnitude assessment m?
4. Can the effect of the amplifier/inhibiter be described as a magnitude dif-
ferential, or does the information in support of it entail another notion of
inhibitor/amplifier?
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5. Is there a set of circumstances x that can be described by X in which the
magnitude differential is in the range m?
The cross-transfer model does not contain a good example of an inhibitor or am-
plifier. Consider an extension of this model that is concerned with cross-transfer of
solid trace materials, such as hairs or fibres. In such a model, the time and movements
of victim and suspect would become important as trace materials such as hairs and
fibres tend to be shed. The total number of traces shed tends to increase over time
and with greater movements. In our model and its extension, transfer of trace materi-
als, say, from suspect to victim makes retrieval of trace material of the suspect from
the victim’s body more likely. Shedding, as affected by time and movement, acts as
an inhibitor on that relationship between transfer and retrieval. Because shedding re-
duces the number of transferred traces that remain on the victim’s body, it becomes
less likely that any transferred traces can still be found.
6 Case Study
This section examines how the approach presented herein is applied by means of a
practical case study. It demonstrates how the argumentation schemes defined above
are employed to construct arguments for constraints on conditional probability tables
and likelihood ratio assessments on the value of evidence, and how the critical ques-
tions associated with these arguments and analysis approaches facilitate validation of
probabilistic models.
The case study employed herein is Aitken, Taroni and Garbolino’s cross-transfer
model [3] because its structure provides a solution to a real-world model, it possesses
the complexity of real-world evidential reasoning problems and its conditional prob-
ability tables include subjective probabilities, probabilities that can be extracted from
data sets and probabilities that stem from the model structure and variable definition.
6.1 Hybrid Argument-Probabilistic Model of the Value of Evidence
The structure of Aitken, Taroni and Garbolino’s cross-transfer model is introduced
in Section 3.1.2 and is presented in Figure 1. In the original paper, this structure
is carefully justified. A set of conditional probability tables are proposed. However,
instead of justifying the individual values in these conditional probability tables, val-
ues that are potentially subjective in nature are identified and a sensitivity analysis
is performed over these values. The cross-transfer model can be applied to a broad
range of cases. In these case studies, a scenario is considered where the alleged crime
g concerns violent altercation that escalates into an assault leading to the death of
the victim, and the evidence concerns transferred blood traces as a result of punches
being exchanged.
The approach taken in this paper is to construct arguments implying constraints
on the values in the conditional probability tables, justified by ancillary evidence and
instantiated from the argumentation schemes introduced in Sections 4 and 5. Due to
the way in which Bayesian networks define conditional independence relationships,
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the probability distribution of each variable only needs to be considered in relation
to its immediate parents in the DAG, thereby decomposing the model construction
problem into a range of smaller ones. In the remainder of this subsection, each of
these smaller subproblems is considered in turn. The arguments instantiated from the
argumentation schemes will be presented in the form of simple argument diagrams
from ancillary evidence to constraint. Because the original paper did not take this
approach, this section contains a reverse engineered set of arguments in support of
conditional probability distributions that were proposed. While this exercise is based
on the discussion in the paper and informal discussions with the authors, these argu-
ments do not necessarily correspond to the views of the authors of the model. The
reader is reminded that what is important for the purposes of this paper is that a qual-
itative justification for conditional probability distributions can be formulated and
validated, and that the implications of rejecting a justification can be computed.
No prior probability distribution for G, representing the guilt/innocence hypoth-
esis will be constructed. As the probability values to be computed as part of the
likelihood ratio are conditioned on defence and prosecution hypotheses that specify
whether the suspect is guilty or innocent, this need not be specified. Background in-
formation concerning the suspect and victim with regards to the potential presence
of trace material may or may not be available. If it is not available at the start of an
investigation or court case, it may become available. For that reason, arguments con-
straining the prior probability distributions of Bv and Bs will be constructed, but these
may be overridden as new direct evidence becomes available.
Figure 3 is an argument diagram concerning the conditional probability table of
Ct , representing contact between victim and suspect. Ct has only one parent variable:
G. The argument diagram contains two sets of arguments, resulting in one constraint
each. The first argues that scenarios where the suspect is guilty (g) entails contact.
Thus g is a sufficient condition for ct . The second argues that, given the circumstances
of the case, contact between victim and suspect is not very likely in circumstances
other than the guilt scenario (though not impossible). Specifically, the improbabil-
ity is defined by an upper bound of 1% on the probability of ct in the absence of
probable explanation. Figure 3 shows the constraints these arguments imply and the
conditional probability table admitted by the constraints.
Figure 4 is an argument diagram concerning the prior probability distribution of
Bi and the conditional probability table of Pi, with i= v,s. It is a post-hoc justification
for the sample values presented in the model by Aitken et. al. [3]. In the model, it
is argued (from data) that only a small proportion of the population (less than 0.1%)
comes into contact with blood spatter (bi). Then, it is argued (from expert judgement)
that if there is no reason to believe that the probability is higher in this particular
case, and an upper bound on the probability distribution of bi is known, then that
upper bound is an upper bound on P(bi).
In this approach to modelling the probability distribution of Pi, the authors equate
the background predisposition of individual i to the presence of trace material with
the presence of trace material on i. In other words, here, Pi is defined as Bi. This is a
sensible approach if Bi can only be modelled as Pi, as is the case when no background
attributes of i imply a particular predisposition to the presence of trace material.
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Fig. 3 Argument Diagram of Arguments Supporting the Conditional Probability Table of Ct
These arguments should be adapted in certain other circumstances. Firstly, evi-
dence may be available that the background of the victim or suspect is such that (s)he
has come into contact with blood spatter prior to the crime under consideration: i.e.
it is known that bv or bs is true. Secondly, even if is not known that bv or bs is not
true, there may be evidence to suggest that there are reasons for P(bi) to be greater
than among the general population, e.g. because of i’s profession, behaviour or med-
ical condition. Thirdly, Bi does not necessarily define Pi, particularly when there are
certain reasons to believe P(bi) to be greater for i than among the general population.
Figure 5 is an argument diagram concerning (potential) evidence of trace transfer
from victim to suspect and from suspect to victim. It presents arguments constraining
the conditional probability tables of two types of variable. The specification of both
conditional probability tables is very similar. Variable Mi identifies whether a test
comparing traces yields a match. As such, Mi is a classification of Ci. Variable RMi
identifies whether a match is reported. As such, RMi is the observation of Mi. Both
types of argument are instances of scheme 12. The specific values in Figure 5 stem
from Aitken, Taroni and Garbolino’s paper, which suggest that the type I error of
classifying Ci (in Mi) is not greater than 0.01%, the type I error of observing Mi (as
RMi) is not greater than 0.1% and the type II error of both is 0.
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Fig. 4 Argument Diagram of Arguments Supporting the Conditional Probability Tables of Bv, Pv, Bs and
Ps
Figure 6 is an argument diagram concerning the conditional probability table Tv.
This figure illustrates how a model can be constructed that contains arguments for
qualitative features, extreme probabilities and quantitative features. A similar model
could be constructed for Ts. In general, it could be argued, however, that the proba-
bility of blood spatter transfer from victim to suspect (ts) is somewhat greater than
the probability of blood spatter from suspect to victim (tv) because the victim is more
likely to be injured more severely. To avoid overcomplicating the example, this will
be ignored herein and the more conservative model of Figure 6 will be applied to Ts
as well.
Finally, Figure 7 is an argument diagram concerning the conditional probability
tables of variables Cv and Cs. This diagram is constructed along the same principles
as the preceding ones.
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Fig. 5 Argument Diagram of Arguments Supporting the Conditional Probability Tables of Cv, Mv, RMv,
Cs, Ms and RMs
6.2 Analysis and Validation
Once the argument models have been specified, their implications can be computed
and the arguments validated. This section demonstrates this by means of the argu-
mentation models of the previous subsection.
For the purposes of computing the implications of argumentation models, two
algorithms are needed that are beyond the scope of this paper. First, the set of solu-
tions to the constraint problems that follow from the argumentation models need to be
computed. A conventional constraint satisfaction algorithm was used, though a range
of algorithms can be employed for this purpose as described in 3.2.2. In Figures 3–7,
the solution space implied by the constraints supported by arguments in the model is
depicted. Second, the extreme points of the solutions space defined in this way are
used to define convex sets of conditional probability values, which are propagated
in a Bayesian network. This is accomplished with a credal network tool [13]. In this
exercise, JavaBayes was employed [14].
Let A be the set of arguments presented in the previous subsection. The value of
the evidence based on A is computed by (4). In the ongoing example, consider, say,
two pieces of evidence: blood spatter matching the suspect is retrieved from the vic-
tim (ev = rmv) and blood spatter retrieved from the suspect does not match the victim
(es = rms). Also consider two hypotheses: a prosecution hypothesis that the suspect is
guilty of the crime (hp = {g}) and a defence hypothesis that the suspect is not guilty
of the crime (hd = {g}). Note that these hypotheses do not include assumptions about
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Fig. 6 Argument Diagram of Arguments Supporting the Conditional Probability Tables of G, Ct and Tv
the backgrounds of the suspect and victim. In this case, the value of the evidence is:
LRA(ev|hp,hd) = PA(RMv|g)PA(RMv|g) = [83,∞)
LRA(es|hp,hd) = PA(RMs|g)PA(RMs|g) = (0,0.901]
This implies that ev provides some support for hp over hd and that es provides some
support for hd over hp. The meaning of the likelihood ratio values in the intervals are
interpreted in the same way as those computed by conventional Bayesian techniques
44 Jeroen Keppens
Pi
Ti
Ci
ti is a necessary
condition for ci
{pi, ti} is a sufficient
condition for ci
P (ci|pi, ti) = 1
P (ci|pi, ti) = 0
P (ci|pi, ti) = 0
P (ci|pi, ti)   13
the lower bound on
the probability of ci
given pi, ti is 13
blood traces from the
other party will not
be retrieved from i
without a transfer
from the other party
to i
if there has been a
transfer from the
other party to i and i
has no background
presence of blood
traces, then any
blood traces
retrieved from i will
be from the other
party
if there are
background blood
traces on i as well as
blood traces
transferred from the
other party, then the
probability that a
blood trace randomly
selected from i is
transferred from the
other party is at least
1
3
the background i is
such that it would be
impossible that a
significantly higher
proportion, say
double the amount,
of blood traces on i
stems from a
background source
than from a violent
contact related
transfer
Pi pi pi
Ti ti ti ti ti
P (ci|Pi, Ti) [ 13 , 1] 0 1 0
Fig. 7 Argument Diagram of Arguments Supporting the Conditional Probability Tables of Cv and Cs
because they have the same meaning. But, the arguments in A are not sufficiently pre-
cise to differentiate between the different values in the range. In other words, the ap-
proach presented herein computes a conservative assessment of the value of evidence
based on sets of likelihood ratios supported by arguments. Using the interpretation
proposed by Cook et. al., these ranges of likelihood ratios suggest that ev provides
at least moderate support for the prosecution hypothesis over the defence hypothesis
and that es provides at least very weak support for the defence hypothesis over the
prosecution hypothesis.
The value of evidence assessments depend on the acceptance of the arguments
in A. These arguments are validated by applying the critical questions associated
with the argumentation schemes that the arguments are instantiated from, and using
these critical questions as a means to find reasons to reject the argument. However,
by computing the effect of rejecting a particular argument, this validation effort can
be focussed on those arguments with the most significant impact. The impact of an
argument is computed by (5).
Consider, for instance, the argument model presented in Figure 7 with respect to
Cv, which implies that i is instantiated to v in this model. This model contains an
assertion that the background of the victim is such that it would be impossible that
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Ct ct ct ct ct
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(0.5,1] 0 0.05 0
...
...
...
...
(0.9,1] 0 0.09 0
1 0 0.1 0
Table 3 Effect of adding argument a′
a significantly higher proportion, say double the amount of blood traces on v stems
from a background source other than s. This implies that P(cv|pv, tv)≥ 13 . In consid-
ering the second of the critical questions of argumentation scheme 14, it is clear that
the assertion involves a comparison based on the relative occurrence of two events:
the transfer of individual units of blood spatter to the victim in the course of the vic-
tim’s background activities and the transfer of individual units of blood spatter from
suspect to victim in the crime under investigation. For the purpose of demonstrating
use of calculating the effect of an argument on the outcome of analysis, suppose that
it is argued that the aforementioned to types of transfer are difficult to compare with
one another (i.e. the answer to critical question 3a is ”no”). Indeed, the argumentation
model presented in Figure 7 does not include evidence of absolute frequencies and it
may not be deemed appraise to specify the above boundary condition.
For these reasons, the entire argument may be deemed suspect. If this line of
reasoning is deemed to defeat the assertion, then the associated argument a, including
constraint P(cv|pv, tv)≥ 13 is removed from the problem. This affects the conditional
probability table in Figure 7 as shown in Table 2. The effect of removing argument a
on the value of evidence ev can be computed by means of (5) as:
LRA/{a}(ev|hp,hd) =
PA/{a}(RMv|g)
PA/{a}(RMv|g)
= [83,∞]
In other words, the value of the evidence is unaffected by this alteration (there is some
effect if more significant digits would be presented, but the effect is negligible). As
such, defeating this argument that the earlier analysis depended on does not invalidate
its conclusion.
If a more precise assessment of the value of evidence is required, arguments must
be formulated that further constrain the conditional probability tables. However, not
all new arguments are equally informative. Yet, all new arguments ought to be vali-
dated. By means of (6), the impact of a new argument can be computed.
For instance, consider a hypothetical situation where the suspect had a tooth re-
moved recently and some data that suggests that in 5% of all cases of contact with
such a person, there could be some transfer of blood spatter from a person who
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had a tooth removed recently. One might argue, rightly or wrongly, that that im-
plies that there is a lower bound on the probability of transfer of blood spatter from
suspect to victim given that there was contact between suspect and victim, irrespec-
tive of whether the suspect is guilty of the crime. But, any debate about this ancil-
lary evidence and its implications is only meaningful if the additional argument a′
has a significant impact on the assessment of the value of the evidence. To evaluate
the impact of this prospective new argument, new constraints P(tv|g,ct) ≥ 0.05 and
P(tv|g,ct)≥ 0.05 are added to the argument model of Figure 6. This additional con-
straint reduces the solution space to the conditional probability table of Tv as specified
in Table 3. The effect of the additional argument a′ can be computed by means of (6)
as:
LRA∪{a′}(ev|hp,hd) = [416,∞]
In other words, the introduction of a′ increases the value of evidence ev with at least a
factor 5. As such, the impact of such an argument would be significant and therefore,
merits consideration.
The above forms of analysis achieve the same objectives that the sensitivity anal-
ysis of an expert formulating a Bayesian model aims to achieve. However, the key
difference of the approach presented herein is that it reasons with concrete, quali-
tatively significant arguments rather than abstract numbers whose meaning and im-
plications can be hard to understand. As such, this work presents a significant step
towards the integration of argumentation and Bayesian based approaches. This al-
lows it to provide some transparency in the way probabilistic models and methods
of analysis lead to conclusions, to help identify how strongly the results depend on
subjective judgement and to support the validation of such subjective judgement.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has presented a novel approach to enable argumentation about probability
distributions in probabilistic models for evidential reasoning in law. It has introduced
a set of argumentation schemes for the construction of argumentation models con-
cerning probability distributions and associated sets of critical questions for their
validation. The use of the proposed approach has been demonstrated by means of an
extended case study concerning a complex realistic probabilistic model for evidential
reasoning.
In this way, this paper addresses an important concern of the use of probabilistic
models for evidential reasoning in law: the use of subjective probability in assessing
the value of evidence. Existing approaches for reasoning with subjective probability
allow for subjective probabilities to be represented as numbers, numerical intervals
or sets of numerical intervals that express a person’s belief in certain propositions,
possibly under certain conditions. But with these approaches, there are no means
to understand where these numbers come from and what justifies, according to the
modeller, their use as an expression of belief. This is an important drawback in legal
applications where inaccurate assessments of the value of evidence can have serious
implications, such as miscarriages of justice.
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In the development of this work, a number of issues have been identified that
need to be addressed in future work. Firstly, the nature of the argumentation models
proposed herein provide opportunities for producing more informed explanations of
the outcome of probabilistic analysis. In earlier work, the author has developed a
technique for the extraction of argumentation models from Bayesian networks. This
could be extended to incorporate the argumentation models considered in this paper.
Secondly, the results of probabilistic models are not only affected by numerical
values, but also by structural ones: the choice of variables to include in the model
and the conditional or unconditional independence relationships that are assumed
between variables. Again, while a range of modelling techniques for these features
exist, such as Bayesian networks, these do not allow for the construction of models
of their rationale with a view to facilitate their validation.
Thirdly, as explained in Section 3, the computation of the implications of accept-
ing arguments concerning conditional probability distributions and changes in the set
of accepted arguments involves computing solutions of a dynamic continuous con-
straint satisfaction problem. This type of problem has not been studied extensively,
even though a wide range of solution algorithms exist for constraint problems that are
either dynamic or continuous, but not both. Future work aims to explore the integra-
tion of such algorithms.
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